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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

*

vs.
*

Case No. 950213-CA

*

JAMES LEE MORENO,

Priority 2
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, entered on the
23rd day of December, 1992.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
by virtue of Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated

78-2a-2 (2) (f) (1953 as amended).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

May a search of a vehicle take place without a

search warrant upon the arrest of the driver for an
unrelated misdemeanor in the absence of probable
cause or exigent circumstances where the driver is
arrested outside his locked vehicle?
2. Are the findings of the trial court allowing
the search of the defendant's vehicle supported by the
record?
3.

Should the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law have been signed over the objections of defendant?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for suppression issues is
that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 215 (Utah App 1991).
The standard of review for conclusions of law is
a correction of error standard.

State v.

Steward, supra.

TABLE OF CASES
and
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVEE
1.

State v^

Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)
2

State vis. Hyah , 711 P.

2d 272 (Utah 1984)

State \LL. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989)
United States }u

Walker, No.

90-CR-13 (Utah 1990)

State v^. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 1991)
State J L Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App 1992)
U.S. L. Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir 1993)
U.S. v^

Anqula-Fernandez, 1995 WL 257255(10th Cir)

United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreas onable searches and seizures,shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
United States Constitution , Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capitol, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces
, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or in public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compel led in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation .
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the
Utah states:

,

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses , papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated and no warran t shall issue but

upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirm ation# partic ularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the 23rd of October, 1991, the defendant followed
a police decoy from State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah,
to the parking lot near the pool area of a motel in Salt
Lake City. (Tr.

5,9)

At that time the defendant parked,

exited and locked his vehicle.

(Tr.

5, 10) The vehicle was

properly parked in the parking lot of the motel and was not
blocking traffic.

(Tr. 7)

As the defendant was walking away from his parked and
locked vehicle, a detective with the Salt Lake City Police
walked up and told him he was under arrest for solicitation
of sex acts, handcuffed the defendant and took him back to
his car.

(Tr.

10) The defendant was then removed from the

area. (Tr. 10)
Officer Jackson of the Salt Lake City Police then
walked back to the defendant's vehicle, looked inside it
and saw on the passenger side a folded bindle.
4

(Tr.

11)

The officers then took the keys from the top of the
defendant's vehicle and took the folded paper and
unfolded it and field tested the powder inside, which
tested positive for the presence of cocaine. (Tr.

11)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In October of 1991 the defendant was charged with
solicitation of sex acts and possession of a controlled
substance. The defendant waived his preliminary hearing
and filed a Motion to Suppress based on constitutional
grounds in the District Court of Salt Lake County, and
on March 20, 1992, said Court, Honorable James S.

Sawaya

presiding, heard said Motion to Suppress and denied the
same on April 7, 1992.
The defendant filed a motion to remand the case back
to the Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, on the 27th day
of July, 1992, for a preliminary hearing based on alleged
failure of a member of the Salt Lake County attorney's
office to fulfill the terms of an alleged plea bargain.
The trial judge ordered an evidentiary hearing and requested
James Cope and John Bucher to attend, but on July 31, 1992,
refused to hear evidence and denied defendant's motion.
The defendant pled guilty conditionally to Possession
5

of a Controlled Substance on November 23, 1992, and the
Honorable

James

S.

Sawaya

stayed

the

execution

of

the

sentence of defendant on December 29, 1992, to allow
the appeal of the denial of the Motion to Suppress. The
Court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause staying the
sentence and accepting the conditional appeal. (R.

at 60)

The Utah Court of Appeals, on the 12th of July, 1994,
issued a Memorandum Decision remanding the case back

to the trial court for issuance of specific findings of
fact and conclusions of law on why the court denied the
defendants Motion to Suppress.

(R.

at 93). The trial court

issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February
22, 1995, over the objections of the defendant filed January
18, 1995. (R. at 97-100). The defendant filed his Notice of
Appeal on March 24, 1995. (R.

at 103).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. MAY A SEARCH OF A VEHICLE TAKE PLACE WITHOUT A
SEARCH WARRANT UPON THE ARREST OF THE DRIVER FOR AN UNRELATED
MISDEMEANOR IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE OR EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE DRIVER IS ARRESTED OUTSIDE THE LOCKED
VEHICLE?
The appellant maintains that the search of his vehicle
and the concomitant seizure should not have taken place
6

without a search warrant because there were no exigent
circumstances nor was there probable cause.
There was no probable cause because the sight of a
folded paper in a car is not indicative of anything which
would justify a warrantless entry, nor are there exigent
circumstances because the defendant was outside his parked
and locked vehicle and he was under arrest for solicitation.
2. ARE THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWING THE
SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD?
The trial court, in a effort to comply with the mandate
of the Court of Appeal's directive that specific findings be
made, merely recited all the possible findings suggested by

the Court of Appeals as examples and no effort was made to
tie the findings to the record.
3. SHOULD THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW HAVE BEEN SIGNED OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENDANT?
When the new Findings and Conclusions were sent to
the defendant's counsel, he timely objected that they do
not accurately reflect the record, however the Findings and
Conclusions were signed a short time thereafter without any
hearing or ruling on the objections.
ARGUMENT

7

1.
WARRANT
TRAFFIC
EXIGENT

MAY A SEARCH OF A VEHICLE TAKE PLACE WITHOUT A SEARCH
UPON A STOP AND ARREST OF THE DRIVER FOR UNRELATED
BENCH WARRANT IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE OR
CIRCUMSTANCES?
A.

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

There seems little doubt that a conditional plea is a
proper procedure for the discussion of a denial of a Motion
to Suppress.

State v. Seary. 758 P.2d 935 (Ut.

1988).

In a like manner, there seems to be little doubt that
the appellant need not argue his standing before an Appeals
Court when his lack of standing has not been questioned and
where the record indicates that the appellant was the owner
and the driver of the vehicle in question State v.
Constantino. 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).

B.

PRIMARY DISCUSSION

Appellant

contends

that

the

combined

probable cause requirements of State v_a_
460, 470 (Utah 1990), and State v.

exigency

and

Larocco, 794 P.2d

Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah

App.1991), as cited with approval in State J L ffajgbjtt, 827
P.2d 969 (Utah App.

1992), have been violated in that the

defendant was outside his lawfully parked vehicle, in a
parking area of a motel, his vehicle was locked and he was
being arrested for a crime (sex act solicitation) which had
8

nothing to do with the status of the vehicle.

The officer

looked in the window and saw a paper which he called a
11

bindle" and claims that it is the kind of magazine fold in

which drugs have been contained (Tr.

13, 14). The officer

could not give a number on the times he knows that tested
drugs were so contained, but that a lot were wrapped that
way.

(Tr.

14, Lines 1 to 14).

(Neither the officer nor any other witness brought the
magazine paper to court for the suppression hearing or any
other hearing (Tr. 12), and appellant contends that this
alone, in the circumstances of this case, deny the State
from claiming they have met their burden.)
In Larocco. supra, the Court stated:
The time has come for what this court, in applying
an automobile exception to the warrant requirement of
article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try
to simplify, if possible, the search and seizure rules
so that they can be more easily followed by the police
and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public
with consistent and predictable protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
This can be
accomplishe d by eliminating some of the confusing

exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been
developed by federal law in recent years.
See id.
Specif icall y, this court will continue to use the
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable
threshold criterion for determining whether article I,
section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional
justification, namely, to protect the safety of police
or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence.
See id; also, Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 76263 (1969)
9

As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh, supra:
Once the threat that the suspect will
injure the officers with concealed weapons
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is
no persuasive reason why the officers
cannot take the time to secure a warrant.
Such a requirement would present little
impediment to police investigations,
especially in light of the ease in
which warrants can be obtained under Utah's
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953,
7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.)
State v.

Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272; see State v. Lopez.

676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984).

The

appellant

contends

that

there

were

no

exigent

circumstances to avoid the search warrant requirement.

That

is, the automobile was not en route outside the officer's
jurisdiction nor anywhere else and there was no reason, as
is claimed by the Findings, to believe the vehicle to be
in any more or different danger than any other vehicle.
In any case, the automobile was parked and locked and
the defendant was on his way to jail.

Even if this Court

does not interpret Larocco. supra, to require a search
warrant in the circumstances of this case, traditional

Fourth Amendment analysis or state constitutional analysis
does not permit the conclusion that the search and seizure
was permissible.
10

IL_ S^ J L

Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir.

1993) has

announced that probable cause exists and a warrantless search
of

an

automobile

is

permitted

if

a

"totality

of the

circumstances" indicate there is a "fair probability" that
the car contains contraband.
are

that

an

officer

The circumstances in this case

looked

through

a

window

of

the

defendant's car and saw a magazine page folded in a way that
he has seen other paper folded which later turned out to have
drugs inside.

There were no drugs present in the car whether

seen or unseen by the officer, there were no drugs on the
defendant, there were no passengers, there was no reason to
assume that the magazine paper had drugs inside at all except
for the officer's experience in the past as to the way it was
folded. The officer neglected to take the magazine paper to
the hearing, so the judge could make no finding as to how it
appeared, but he described it as a folded magazine paper
maybe an inch and one-half square.

(Tr.

12), and that he

did not know of the number of folded papers like that he had
seen

which

later

was

established

contained

a controlled

substance (Tr. 14), except that there were a lot (Tr. 14).
With that kind of foundation, an intrusion into all cars in
every parking lot could be justified, if they contained a
folded magazine page or other paper which at least some
officer in the department could say they had seen drugs

11

wrapped in"lots of times".
It becomes unclear on pages 11 and 12 of the Transcript,
what led the officer to believe the package was cocaine,
whether it was the fold or the fact it was a magazine, but a
fair paraphrase would be that it was the fold.

Unless some

other factor is present which would lead one to believe the
magazine contained a controlled substance, how is it that
a search of an automobile may take place upon the experience
of

officers

when

they

are

not

able

to

lay

any better

foundation than an officer for two years who has seen a lot
of papers folded the way of this case.

(Tr. 13).

Again,

there are no other relevant circumstances, the sight of the
paper alone is the justification used for the search and the
appellant contends that this justification is simply too
casual and skimpy to permit intrusions into the privacy
of automobiles which are typically full of paper of all
sorts.

The appellant urges that even if this Court does not
conclude that Larocco. supra, does not interpret the state
constitutional provisions in such a way as to require a
warrant, that the Court should rule that the State did not
meet its burden at the trial court level to show that a
warrantless search was lawful.

State v^

Christensen. 676

P.2d 408 Utah 1984), in that the suspected package was not
produced

nor

was

there

sufficient

12

foundation

for

the

o r I* 11 ' H i

• ",

( i i i; 11 i i i "

ii

I 11 I l i i

11 in I i n in

..

11 i III i e cii* a i i i i i L e .

The appellant urges that Larocco#s, supra, purpose to
simplify automobile search and seizure law by. requiring a
3

sear

cause and exigent circumstances, and that such searches are
per se unreasonable without the exigent circumstances that
tliie

I 1 mi 1 I ( 1 i

mi I ill

II

Il 11 I

Late

v.

Romero r

1 11 1

11! " I 5

(Utah 1983).

As in Larocco. supra, the officers 1 *•*« ^ase bar could

indication that the car would not be available for such a
search at the place where it was parked.

II. ARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT ALLOWING
THE SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD?
Following the hearing held March 20, 1992 on Mr. Moreno's
Motion to Suppress Evidence, the District Court entered four
Findings of Fact.

Upon review, the

Utah Court of Appeals may

reject these findings if upon the record they are clearly
erroneous.

A review of the hearing transcript reveals that the

court did not make findings consistent with the evidence put
forth at the hearing nor drew the proper conclusions from the
findings it made.
In its Finding No. 1, the court states that Mr. Moreno
"jumped from his car and quickly locked it" after parking in the
Colonial Hotel parking lot.

Nowhere in the transcript of the

hearing are Mr. Moreno's actions characterized in this
prejudicial manner.

Officer Jackson stated that Mr. Moreno

simply "got out, locked his door, stood there . . . "
10, 11. 8-9)

(Tr. at p.

Officer Harris told the court that "Mr. Moreno

exited the vehicle" but says nothing about the manner in which
Mr. Moreno locked his vehicle.

(Tr. at p. 15, 1. 16) Nor did

Mr. Moreno himself state that he "jumped" out of his car and
"quickly" locked it. (Tr. at p. 5)

The only place in the

transcript where Mr. Moreno's actions are characterized in such a
manner is during the argument by County Attorney Thomas P. Vuyk
found on page 20 in which he says, "This is the entire process
the officers had reason to be suspicious when he jumped out of
the car and locked it." (Emphasis added.)
Despite the well established rule that an attorney's
argument is not evidence and cannot be used as the basis for a

14

court's findings of fact,

obvious that the district court

improperly relied

iirgumem

Not only did i1: borrow **
adding the word "quick]
was pivotal

1.

State's language but
%

-_.

xpandeu . <: by

\~^ if this particular language

r

argument

to search Mr. Moreno's vehicle

~

2
andows Mr. Moreno's actions

with a furtiveness that the evidence at hearing,

rresting

officers' own testimony, does i I ::: • t: suppoi
have inferred from the testimony that Mr. Moreno's actions were
i , |, rirT, fJfl <| because there is no evidence from any

* the three

witnesses that Mr. Moreno was aware
officers' presence prior to h Is exit from and the locking of hi s
indina

No. 1 is clearly erroneous and must be

rejected.
The court also erred ,; it s Finding of Fact Nos. ~ ~ ~ by
hhe arresting officers asked Mr.
Moreno if they could search
patrol vehicle.

>> car prior to placing

(Tr. at

This timing is important because

-formed desire
Moreno's vehicle regardless

the officers to search Mr

the warrant requirement.

It was

only after Mr. Moreno had refused and been placed in a police
vehir I

II I

! 1" in ci Jackson looked into the vehicle and saw the

alleged bindle.

Having already arrested " '

M ;.. i vi

solicitation iic reason existed for Officer Jackson
:he result
The vehicle had no relation

*•

true Terry stop.

the crime with which Mr

had been charged.

15

look into

Moreno

In addition, Mr. Moreno testified that the officers asked
him a second time whether they could search his car to which he
replied no.

(Tr. at p. 6, 11. 19-21)

The officers then stated

that they had "a right to go in there" even though they had not
obtained a warrant to do so.

(Tr. at p. 7) This important fact

was not disputed at the hearing yet was nowhere mentioned by the
district court.

It further confirms the police's intent to

search the vehicle regardless of consent or warrant.
Mr. Moreno also objects to the court's finding that Officer
Jackson observed a lfbindle of cocaine.11

At numerous points in

the hearing the officers referred to the object removed from Mr.
Moreno's car as a folded paper or a piece of magazine which was
not clear. (Tr. at pp. 11, 12 & 17-18)

The testimony of Officer

Jackson reveals that he could not see what substance, if any, was
inside the folder piece of paper.

(Tr. at p. 12, 11. 18-19)

Only after seizing the paper, opening it, and testing the
contents did he ascertain that it allegedly contained cocaine.
At no time did Officer Jackson indicate that he saw cocaine or
other contraband in Mr. Moreno's vehicle.

Therefore, the

district court's finding that he observed a "bindle of cocaine"
is clearly erroneous and must be set aside.
Mr. Moreno asserts that the district court's findings are so
erroneous as to require the reversal of the district court's
conviction.

However, even assuming the court's findings are

correct, they do not support the conclusions of law it makes.
Conclusions of law may be overturned under the "correction of
error" standard of review.

16

Till

I
l in i 1 ndes that the alleged contraband was

view in Mr. Moreno's vehic.
specify that only a bindle

"" '

*; i * in

' >" i"

^ folded paper that was opaque) was

i

* ^-- not find that the officers

could see cocaine

iiiiiiiiiiiti nil

> m
i

folded paper has not been construed as an illegal substance or
the officers said was that they
saw a piece of folded paper which they
cocaine.

COncludeo

The experience of the officers with this type
fficer Jackson could not specify

even estimate how many times he # d found a conl fuJ I<HJ
this kind of folded paper (Tr.

_

""

,il

n

zhe only

experience with a so-called bindle
was that he'd "run into them several times" d u u m i 111". - i in h.
(Tr. at p

li

I 22-23)

There is absolutely no evidence of how

long

cement officer

he's had to observe this type of bindle.
findings as to the experience

*

opportunity

The __.,.

ma (

qualifications of the officers

Another error the court makes i: characterizing
paper seized as contraband.
c o l i/La ii i'fii

Such characterization assumes that a

hit" rrthhini I !i , i

be i n the container.

illegal substance that may

This is

example, a backpack in an automobile is often a place where
State to I h n t-ec-t-

marijuana

however, to argue that the warrantless search and seizure

f

I

i

backpack observed on the front passenger seat of a parked, locked

17

car# without more, is constitutional.

Even under the district

court's findings, the conclusion that contraband was in plain
view is erroneous and must be overturned.
The court also concluded that the search was necessary due
to exigent circumstances.

In its Conclusion of Law No. 4, the

court held that the alleged contraband could have been stolen or
destroyed by passers-by if not seized immediately.

The Findings

of Fact, however, do not reveal any circumstances of the arrest
that indicate this was a danger.

There is no testimony from the

officers that they were concerned with third parties taking or
destroying the evidence.

The car was locked.

And although the

court states that the bindle was "obvious contraband", it did not
set forth any findings that would support this conclusion.

It

did not because it could not given the evidence on the record.
The bindle was not even introduced into evidence at the hearing.
(Tr. at p. 12)
The court appears concerned that if the police had given Mr.
Moreno a mere citation rather than arresting him, he could have
driven away before the police could obtain a warrant.
Theoretically this may be true.

However, if the officers felt

that they had enough suspicion to apply for a warrant could they
not simply arrest the defendant and take him into custody, as
they did here, thus preventing him from driving off?

Wouldn't it

defy logic to write a citation under these particular
circumstances if the option of custodial arrest existed?
answers to these questions is a resounding "yes."
officers involved in the arrest.

18

The

There were two

One could have stayed behind

\

"nfl,"- ' vehicle while the other applied for the warrant.

A telephonic warrant was «. so ava„ .,
vehicle was parked, locked, and
)

'ocked, parked

>:<i parking

11 the stree4

was

danger of being driven

away by a passenger or the defendant
conclusion that exigent circumstances existed is not based upon
"indings and is therefore in error.

The only way

to correct such error is to overturn the
prohibit the State from introducing the bindle at trial.

19

CONCLUSION

The appellant maintains that the State has not
met the burden to show this search was constitutional
without a warrant because there was no probable cause
and no exigent circumstance exist
DATED THIS

194i.

day of

Respectfully Submitted,

DELIVERY/CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was delivered to the following on the
M a y of June, 1995.

J. Frederick Voros
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JAMES M. COPE, 0726
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

-vs)

CaseNo.911901754FS

'

Judge James S. Sawaya

JAMES LEE MORENO,
Defendant.

The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on regularly for hearing on March
20, 1992. The Court heard testimony from the defendant, James Moreno, and from police
officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris. The Court also heard argument from defendant's
counsel and the State's counsel. Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On 23 October 1991, the defendant approached a woman on Main Street near

1400 South. The woman was working with officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris in an
effort to suppress prostitution activities in the area, but the defendant did not know this. He
offered the woman $35.00 to "party" with him. The decoy agreed and told defendant to follow
her to the Colonial Hotel parking lot. As soon as defendant stopped in the lot, his vehicle was
sandwiched by two police cars. The defendant jumped from his car and quickly locked it. He
was then placed under arrest for solicitation of prostitution.

22

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
CaseNo.911901754FS
Page 2

2.

Officer Harris, who arrested the defendant, handcui

to his arrest. The contents of defendant's pockets were placed on the roof of defendant's vehicle.
Defendant

rs where Harris began writing a citation for the

solicitation charge.
3.

rnc

i »*- ;r Jackson looked through the window of

defendant's vehic

-

led him to believe was a "'bindle of

cocaine" on the passenger front seat. He pointed this bindle out to Officer Harris, then took
defendant's keys from the roof of the car, unlocked the vehicle, and removed the bindle.
White powde.

cocaine,

defendant admitted to police officers that the bindle contained cocaine and belonged to him.
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Although a warrantless search such as the one here is presumed to be illegal, Utah
I

i vu i, > 11L'Co 111.11 i i i 111111111111111 i i). i \ i r searched if there is both probable cause and exigent

circumstances. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190.
2,

5 (Utah App.

Probable cause to open the defendant's locked vehicle was established as soon as

[In diuy c\\j\ nun i.illl

Illln i i iihstTvnl Hi • liiiiiiirilii III niini < iirw on the front seat. No search had

taken place before this observation of the contraband. The police were certainly entitle^
whatever a member of the public could see from that same vantage point. State v. Leey 633 P.2d
A
Officer Jackson's seizure of the bindle necessitated his entry, into the defendants
into the car without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances.
The exigent circumstances in this <
destruction of evidence which the easily-seen bindle presented for anyone looking into
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defendant's car. This parking lot was open to the public, including prostitutes and their Johns. If
the defendant were to receive only a citation, he could drive his vehicle away before police could
obtain a warrant to seize the bindle. If the defendant were to be booked, the police would be
remiss to allow such obvious contraband to be left in open view in a public place while the
vehicle's driver was taken to the jail.
5.

Officer Jackson's warrantless entry into the vehicle to seize the bindle complied

with all constitutional strictures.
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in this matter shall be and hereby is DENIED.
DATED this / / ~~day of February, 1995.
BY THE COURTS \
\ /

JAMES S. SAWAYA, Judge'

Approved as to form:

JOHN R. BUCHER
Attorney for Defendant
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CKRTTFTCATE OF SERVICE
the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law And Order was mailed to John R. Bucher, Attorney for Defendant James
Lee Moreno, at 1343 South 1100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 on the £%
1995.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State Of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v

*

Jamie Lee Moreno,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

)

Case No. 930009-CA

)
)
)

F I L E D
(July 12, 1994)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable James S. Sawaya
Attorneys:

Aric Cramer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand the
case for entry of findings.
In February 1992, defendant filed a motion to suppress
certain evidence that was seized from his automobile in October
1991. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued a
minute entry denying thQ motion. Unfortunately, the trial court
improperly failed to specify any basis for its denial of
defendant's motion. See State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784
n.26 (Utah App.) (requiring specific factual findings to support
trial court's decision on motion to suppress), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l
(Utah App. 1990) (same), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
While a warrant is generally required to search and seize
evidence, there are exceptions to this general rule, including
search incident to arrest, plain view, and the automobile
exception. In the present case, however, there are no findings
as to which, if any, of the exceptions the trial court relied
upon in denying the motion.
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John R. Bucher 0474
Attorney for Defendant
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
487-5971
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.9H901754FS

vs.
JAMES LEE MORENO,
Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya

Come Now John R. Bucher, attorney for the defendant above and submits the following
objections to those certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff in
the above:

1. The defendant objects to the finding that his vehicle was "sandwiched" by two police cars.
No testimony exists to support said finding and the correct testimony is on page 9 of the transcript.
2. The defendant objects to the statement in finding number 2 that officer Jackson had experience
which led'him to believe the paper he saw in the vehicle of the defendant was cocaine.
The Officer testified that he had been a narcotics officer for two years and that he has seen bindles
folded the way the subject bindle was folded
3. No conclusion of law was ever reached that the parking lot was "open to the public"
and no evidence was ever presented in any form that the parking lot was open to the public.
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Dated this

Mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. flames Cope Esq^a-EJeputy District Attorney this
18th day of February, 1995.
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